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“I’ll help you out of your hole,
old man,” said Smith with rough
tenderness. “I’ll put the puppy out of
his pain.”
“Do you mean to kill me?” the
professor cried, retreating to the
window.
“It’s not a thing I’d do for everyone,” Smith said with emotion. “But
you and I seemed to have got so intimate tonight, somehow. I know all
your troubles now, and the only
cure, old chap.
“It’ll soon be over, you know,”
Smith continued. And as the warden
made a run for the window and
leapt out awkwardly onto the flying
buttress below, he followed him like
a benefactor with a deeply compassionate look, the revolver in his hand
like a gift.
Both men were surprised to see
the first streaks of dawn. Their time
together had begun nearly 24 hours
earlier at Dr. Eames’s morning lecture. After a day packed with undergraduate affairs, it had resumed late
at night in the warden’s rooms. Dr.
Eames, it was known, was always in
for his friends and favorite students
at any hour of the night.
“I came to see you at this
unearthly hour,” Smith had said as
they started their ruminations,
“because I am coming to the conclusion that existence is really too rotten. I know all the arguments of the
thinkers who think otherwise, bishops and agnostics and those sort of
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common to us all.

“A

h, hang the world!” The
large, somewhat sullen undergraduate could take no
more. He slammed his fist
on the table and rudely
broke into the professor’s speech.
“Let’s give it a bad name first and
then hang it,” the professor went on
unruffled, not realizing the mood
had changed. “A puppy with hydrophobia would probably struggle
for life while we killed it, but if we
were kind we should kill it. So an
omniscient god would put us out of
our pain. He would strike us dead.”
“Why doesn’t he strike us dead?”
the student asked.
“He is dead himself,” said the
philosopher; “that is where he is
really enviable.”
The eminent warden of the col-

lege continued, “To anyone who
thinks, the pleasures of life, trivial
and soon tasteless, are bribes to
bring us into a torture chamber.” He
was in full flood now, with all the
jaded brilliance of an academic on a
well-worn theme.
“We all see that for any thinking
man mere extinction is the . . . What
are you doing? . . . Are you mad? . . .
Put that thing down!”
Dr. Emerson Eames, distinguished
professor of philosophy and warden
of Brakespeare College, Cambridge,
found himself looking down the cold,
small, black barrel of a cocked revolver in the hands of one of his
brightest students, Innocent Smith.
*Os Guinness is Senior Fellow at the
Trinity Forum in McLean, Virginia.
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people. And knowing you were the
greatest living authority on the pessimistic thinkers—”
“All thinkers,” Eames had said,
“are pessimistic thinkers.” And with
a weary cynicism he had kept up this
depressing conversation for several
hours until something in Innocent
Smith had snapped.
Now, with the dawn breaking and
Eames’s legs hanging over the buttress and the buttress hanging over
the void below, the mood changed
again.
“The puppy struggles,” Smith
said with pity; “the poor little puppy
struggles. How fortunate it is that I
am wiser and kinder than he.”
“Smith,” said the philosopher, “I
shall go mad!”
“And so look at things from the
right angle,” Smith sighed. “Ah, but
madness is only a palliative at best, a
drug. The only cure is an operation—an operation that is always
successful. Death.”
As he spoke, the sun rose, turning
the sky from pigeon gray to pink.
Bells rang, birds sang, the roofs of
the ancient town were lit with fire,
and the sun rose farther with a glory
too deep for the skies to hold. Suddenly the unhappy man on the last
morning of his life could bear it no
longer.
“Let me come off this place. I
can’t bear it.”
“I rather doubt it will bear you,”
Smith said, referring to the delicate
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stonework; “but before you break
your neck, or I blow out your brains
. . . I want the metaphysical point
cleared up. Do I understand that you
want to get back to life?”
“I’d give anything to get back,”
replied the unhappy professor.
“Give anything!” cried Smith;
“then blast your impudence, give us
a song!” Which the startled professor
was prodded to do, a hymn of gratitude for existence. Satisfied, Smith
fired two barrels over his head and
let him climb to the ground.
“I must ask your indulgence,”
Smith said brokenly when they were
together again. “I must ask you to
realize that I have just had an escape
from death.”
“You have had an escape from
death?” the professor said with irritation.
“Oh, don’t you understand, don’t
you understand?” Smith cried. “I
had to do it, Eames. I had to prove
you wrong or die. When a man’s
young, he nearly always has someone whom he thinks the top watermark of the mind of man. . . . Well,
you were that to me. . . . Don’t you
see that I had to prove you didn’t
really mean it. Or else drown myself
in the canal.”
Smith continued, “The thing I
saw shining in your eyes when you
dangled from that buttress was
enjoyment at life and not ‘the Will to
Live.’ What you knew when you sat
on that damned gargoyle was that

the world, when all is said and done,
is a wonderful and beautiful place. I
know it, because I knew it at the
same minute.”
Ready to hand himself in and face
being sent down from Cambridge,
Innocent Smith finished with one
last meditation.
“I mean to keep the remaining
shots for people in the shameful
state you and I were in last night—I
wish we could even plead drunkenness. I mean to keep those bullets for
pessimists—pills for pale people.
And in this way, I want to make this
world like a wonderful surprise—to
float as idly as the thistledown and
come as silently as the sunrise; not to
be expected any more than the thunderbolt, not to be recalled any more
than the dying breeze. . . . I am going
to hold a pistol to the head of the
Modern Man. But I shall not use it
to kill him. Only to bring him to
life.”

In 1892 Gilbert Keith Chesterton was an 18-year-old student
at the Slade School of Art in London. Far from the stiff-upper-lip
primness of the caricature of Victorianism, the end-of-the-century
world of art was swirling with decadence, cynicism, and
pessimism. Chesterton himself was also drawn to the macabre
and the occult. In other words, his world was remarkably similar
to our postmodern one.

simply a flight of Chesterton’s imagination but the fruit of his own life.
In 1892 Gilbert Keith Chesterton
was an 18-year-old student at the
Slade School of Art in London. Far
from the stiff-upper-lip primness of
the caricature of Victorianism, the
end-of-the-century world of art was
swirling with decadence, cynicism,
and pessimism. Chesterton himself
was also drawn to the macabre and
the occult. In other words, his world
was remarkably similar to our postmodern one.
But however much such pessimism and cynicism was the rage
and however drawn to it he felt, one
thing held Chesterton back: what he
described later as a “thin thread of
thanks,” a sort of “mystical minimum of gratitude.” Bursting with
gratitude for the gift of life, he was
waking up to wonder as he set out to
search for a philosophy that would
allow him to be realistic and yet
“enjoy enjoyment” too.
In the course of his search, Ches-

* * *
Shortened and slightly retold, this
inimitable passage is from G. K.
Chesterton’s Manalive. Fabulous and
fantastic, Chesterton’s writing itself
floats “as idly as the thistledown.”
And like his jesting Innocent Smith,
he too holds his pistol to the head of
Modern Man—and also to the head
of Postmodern Man and Woman—
not to kill them but to bring them to
life. And the story, of course, is not
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terton not only came to faith; he came
to faith by becoming an arch-skeptic
about skepticism, a radical disbeliever
in the fashionable disbelief. He found
the skeptics and cynics not skeptical
and cynical enough. Far from stopping short of tough questioning, the
faith Chesterton came to was the
other side of such questioning—and
all the stronger for having gone
through it.
Cold Comfort
Chesterton’s journey in life and
his story in Manalive highlight an
effective response to skeptics and
those who insist on a radical relativism that is impervious to traditional claims to truth. Curiously, his
approach is exactly the opposite of
what most people try to do.
Advocates of traditional views of
truth often respond to relativists in
the same way as English or American tourists traveling in France who
speak their English more slowly and
loudly. Similarly, proponents of tra-
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bunker debunked, and what emerges
is an almost pristine realization of
the importance of truth.
Wasn’t this the assumption behind the prophet Elijah’s challenge
to Israel in the ninth century B.C.? If
Baal, and not yhwh, was God, then
follow Baal, he cried as he offered
the prophets of Baal the first opportunity to verify their god. With the
bulk of the people sitting uneasily
on the fence between God and Baal,
Elijah knew that pious calls to return
to God would have fallen on divided
hearts and deaf ears. He had to
mount the challenge on their
grounds.
For if yhwh is God, then Baal is
not, and the fastest way for the people to see it was to push them toward
the false faith that was bound to be
falsified by reality. The disproof
came first and cleared the ground
for the proof, for with the false falsified the true could be verified. “The
Lord—he is God! The Lord—he is
God!” was the people’s conclusion
with heartfelt conviction.
The same logic runs down
through the centuries. Jesus said, “By
their fruits you will know them”—
not by their seed. If you had spoken
to the prodigal son the day he left
home, would he have listened? If you
spoke to him the day he hit the
pigsty, would he have needed to?
“See where it leads to,” St. Augustine
advised in dealing with falsehood.
Follow it out to “the absolute ruddy

Radical relativists may deny that there are objective facts but are
strangely insistent on circulating highly detailed résumés.
Postmodernist professors may claim that authors are without privilege in determining how their texts are interpreted, but woe
betide the reviewer who misinterprets their latest contribution to
scholarship and human knowledge.

ditional views commonly underscore the objectivity of truth in ever
more earnest and labored ways. And
then, when they fail to carry their
point, they mask their frustration by
issuing dire warnings of the consequences of disagreeing with them.
The result is mutual incomprehension and a stalemate.
Peter Berger, however, has put
forward two ways to counter radical
relativism. The first effective strategy
for countering relativism on its own
grounds is negative: “Relativizing
the relativizers.” By this is meant
applying to skeptics the skepticism
they apply to others, thus pushing
them out toward the negative consequences of their own beliefs. Chesterton’s professor has one attitude
toward life and death in his comfortable college rooms but quite another
when hanging grimly to the buttress
while staring down the barrel of a
gun. When turned on him, his philosophy of life is cold comfort.
As Berger points out, the strategy
rests on two assumptions. The first is

that relativism and skepticism entail
a hidden double standard—the relativism is inconsistent and incomplete. All too often, relativists relativize others but not themselves.
They relativize the past but not the
present. They pour the acid of their
relativism over all sorts of issues but
jealously guard their own favorite
ones. A recent study of classical
education in the universities points
to this attribute when it defines the
present-day American academic as
“a well-fed, elite, institutionalized
thinker of the late 20th century, who
crafts ideas for his peers, with the
assurance that the consequences of
those solutions should not and will
not necessarily apply to himself.”
The strategy’s second assumption
is that consistency and clarity are
linked. The task of encountering relativism, Berger writes, is to “see the
relativity business to its very end.”
Press relativism to its consistent conclusion and the result is surprising.
Far from paralyzing thought, relativism is itself relativized, the de-
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end,” C. S. Lewis remarked with characteristic Englishness. Push them to
“the logic of their presuppositions,”
Francis Schaeffer used to say.
Examples of inconsistencies
abound. Marxist sociologists may be
adept at spotting exploitation in a
kindergarten but have Mexican nannies and pay their teaching assistants
poorly. Smart-aleck high school students may insist that “everything is
relative” yet will be the first to object
if teachers grade their papers without any standards, such as “I didn’t
like your paper—it’s Tuesday.” Radical relativists may deny that there are
objective facts but are strangely
insistent on circulating highly detailed résumés. Postmodernist professors may claim that authors are
without privilege in determining
how their texts are interpreted, but
woe betide the reviewer who misinterprets their latest contribution to
scholarship and human knowledge.
And so on.
All these examples betray relatively trivial contradictions that are
more suitable for humor than persuasive debate. But what counts is
when the relativism matters to the
relativist, when it becomes a question of life and not simply logic. In
such cases, the strategy and the logic
are the same. The relativists’ problem is not their clash with us but
their contradiction with reality and
therefore the cost to themselves.
When I studied philosophy as an
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undergraduate in the 1960s, an Arctic chill was still hanging in the air
that froze any serious appreciation
of religion. The source had been the
philosophy of A. J. Ayer, who asserted that only that which could be
tested by the five senses could be verified as true. Theology was therefore
“non-sense,” or as it was famously
said, “The word g-o-d is less meaningful than the word d-o-g.”
The trouble for A. J. Ayer was
that his verification principle
couldn’t verify itself—it was selfrefuting. To accept as truth only
what can be tested by the senses is a
principle that itself cannot be tested
by the senses. It too is non-sense.
Ayer’s approach, he later admitted,
was “a blind alley.”
Again and again the lesson is simple: While no argument is unarguable, some thoughts can be
thought but not lived. So we should
never stop halfway in dealing with
skepticism but follow ideas uncompromisingly to their conclusion.
When heads collide with the wall,
they will have reached the limits of
their position and will be open to
reconsider. In this sense, reality is
what we run into when we are
wrong, for when we are right, we
don’t run into it. “There are times,”
Václav Havel wrote, “when we must
sink to the bottom of our misery to
understand truth, just as we must
descend to the bottom of a well to
see the stars in broad daylight.”

Crisis and Opportunity
The strategy of “relativizing the
relativizers” has both a sobering and
encouraging side. The sobering side
arises from the fact that ideas have
consequences. The tactic can easily
be reduced to a game—and a heartless one—but this obscures its real
mercy: Because the skeptics’ view is
finally untrue, it is in their interest to
discover it in good time. But even if
we care so little that we say and do
nothing, life itself will most likely
push the skeptics out to face reality
anyway, and the final outcome may
be far less pleasant.
Put differently, all people at some
point behave true to their beliefs.
Sooner or later they will act on the
assumptions they truly hold and
reap the consequences. We often say
that people don’t “live up to their
beliefs,” but it would be more accurate to say that, in a crunch such as
temptation, they switch to other
beliefs and live up to those instead.
We do live by our beliefs. The question is, which ones?
Now although someone’s beliefs
and assumptions may not be true and
do not describe reality, they will still
drive their behavior. So if someone
doesn’t believe in truth, count on him
to lie. If someone says there are no
objective facts, expect her to be careless with facts to further her own
interests. If someone explains everything by referring to evolution and
the “selfish gene,” be sure that at some
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All people at some point behave true to their beliefs. Sooner or
later they will act on the assumptions they truly hold and reap the
consequences. We often say that people don’t “live up to their
beliefs,” but it would be more accurate to say that, in a crunch such
as temptation, they switch to other beliefs and live up to those
instead. We do live by our beliefs. The question is, which ones?

point he will be extremely selfish on
behalf of the fitness of his own survival. If someone describes newborn
babies as “replaceable” and of no
more value than snails, you can bet
that she will become an advocate of
“involuntary euthanasia” (in other
words, murder), and so on.
The principle also holds true for
nations, for ideas have consequences. Differences make a difference. Behavior follows beliefs as
surely as thunder follows lightning.
What starts in the studies will end
in the streets. When it comes to
postmodernism, the stunning fact
is that we do not have to predict its
consequences—we have already
seen the influence of its core ideas
on history. Do we really imagine
there can be no consequences a second time around?
Not far from his death in 1951,
French writer Andre Gide reflected
on the influence of intellectuals on
the moral and cultural weakness of
France in the first half of the 20th
century. He dismissed the scape7

goating of writers and the smearing
of whole eras and schools. He
emphatically rejected the fascists’
charge that the intellectuals had
“discouraged and devitalized”
French youth. But still, he acknowledged that his generation of artists
had introduced a power-worshiping
vitality and barbarism to France.
Yet the crisis, at its very worst, is
the opportunity. The darkest night is
just before dawn. In terms of distance, the prodigal’s pigsty is the farthest point from home; in terms of
time, the pigsty is the shortest distance to the father’s house. That is
one reason people of faith are not
overcome by crises. As Chesterton
wrote in Orthodoxy, “If any frightened curate still says that it will be
awful if the darkness of free thought
should spread, we can only answer
him in the high and powerful words
of Mr. Belloc, ‘Do not, I beseech you,
be troubled about the increase of
forces already in dissolution. You
have mistaken the hour of the night:
It is already morning.’”
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undergraduate in the 1960s, an Arctic chill was still hanging in the air
that froze any serious appreciation
of religion. The source had been the
philosophy of A. J. Ayer, who asserted that only that which could be
tested by the five senses could be verified as true. Theology was therefore
“non-sense,” or as it was famously
said, “The word g-o-d is less meaningful than the word d-o-g.”
The trouble for A. J. Ayer was
that his verification principle
couldn’t verify itself—it was selfrefuting. To accept as truth only
what can be tested by the senses is a
principle that itself cannot be tested
by the senses. It too is non-sense.
Ayer’s approach, he later admitted,
was “a blind alley.”
Again and again the lesson is simple: While no argument is unarguable, some thoughts can be
thought but not lived. So we should
never stop halfway in dealing with
skepticism but follow ideas uncompromisingly to their conclusion.
When heads collide with the wall,
they will have reached the limits of
their position and will be open to
reconsider. In this sense, reality is
what we run into when we are
wrong, for when we are right, we
don’t run into it. “There are times,”
Václav Havel wrote, “when we must
sink to the bottom of our misery to
understand truth, just as we must
descend to the bottom of a well to
see the stars in broad daylight.”

Crisis and Opportunity
The strategy of “relativizing the
relativizers” has both a sobering and
encouraging side. The sobering side
arises from the fact that ideas have
consequences. The tactic can easily
be reduced to a game—and a heartless one—but this obscures its real
mercy: Because the skeptics’ view is
finally untrue, it is in their interest to
discover it in good time. But even if
we care so little that we say and do
nothing, life itself will most likely
push the skeptics out to face reality
anyway, and the final outcome may
be far less pleasant.
Put differently, all people at some
point behave true to their beliefs.
Sooner or later they will act on the
assumptions they truly hold and
reap the consequences. We often say
that people don’t “live up to their
beliefs,” but it would be more accurate to say that, in a crunch such as
temptation, they switch to other
beliefs and live up to those instead.
We do live by our beliefs. The question is, which ones?
Now although someone’s beliefs
and assumptions may not be true and
do not describe reality, they will still
drive their behavior. So if someone
doesn’t believe in truth, count on him
to lie. If someone says there are no
objective facts, expect her to be careless with facts to further her own
interests. If someone explains everything by referring to evolution and
the “selfish gene,” be sure that at some
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All people at some point behave true to their beliefs. Sooner or
later they will act on the assumptions they truly hold and reap the
consequences. We often say that people don’t “live up to their
beliefs,” but it would be more accurate to say that, in a crunch such
as temptation, they switch to other beliefs and live up to those
instead. We do live by our beliefs. The question is, which ones?

point he will be extremely selfish on
behalf of the fitness of his own survival. If someone describes newborn
babies as “replaceable” and of no
more value than snails, you can bet
that she will become an advocate of
“involuntary euthanasia” (in other
words, murder), and so on.
The principle also holds true for
nations, for ideas have consequences. Differences make a difference. Behavior follows beliefs as
surely as thunder follows lightning.
What starts in the studies will end
in the streets. When it comes to
postmodernism, the stunning fact
is that we do not have to predict its
consequences—we have already
seen the influence of its core ideas
on history. Do we really imagine
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goating of writers and the smearing
of whole eras and schools. He
emphatically rejected the fascists’
charge that the intellectuals had
“discouraged and devitalized”
French youth. But still, he acknowledged that his generation of artists
had introduced a power-worshiping
vitality and barbarism to France.
Yet the crisis, at its very worst, is
the opportunity. The darkest night is
just before dawn. In terms of distance, the prodigal’s pigsty is the farthest point from home; in terms of
time, the pigsty is the shortest distance to the father’s house. That is
one reason people of faith are not
overcome by crises. As Chesterton
wrote in Orthodoxy, “If any frightened curate still says that it will be
awful if the darkness of free thought
should spread, we can only answer
him in the high and powerful words
of Mr. Belloc, ‘Do not, I beseech you,
be troubled about the increase of
forces already in dissolution. You
have mistaken the hour of the night:
It is already morning.’”
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Guinness: Turning the Tables
A Fresh-Thinking Smart-Bomb
Peter Berger’s first strategy for
countering relativism—relativizing
the relativizers—is unashamedly
negative. This in itself leaves some
people uncomfortable, and an added
problem occurs when people use the
approach in a purely logical way. In
searching for any and all contradictions, they end up being tiresomely
fussy and unconvincing.
In contrast, the real task is to be
prophetic, not pedantic; to search
for contradictions that matter—and
matter not to us but to the people we
are engaging. In other words, the
goal is to look for the contradictions
between logic and life, to search for
the tension between the relativism
or skepticism of their philosophy
and the “treasure of their heart.”
Only the latter will become a smartbomb to detonate fresh thinking.
Because of the negative nature of
the first strategy, many people are
more drawn to the second tactic for
countering relativism on its own
grounds, which is entirely positive:
“Pointing out the signals of transcendence.” By this is meant the
strategy of drawing attention to the
contradiction and yearnings within
people’s beliefs that point beyond
those beliefs toward entirely different possibilities.
Whereas “relativizing the relativizers” is negative because it highlights the negative consequences of
false assumptions, “pointing out the

experience that stopped him in his
tracks and turned him around to
start his journey toward faith.
In 1939 Auden emigrated to the
United States. In November, two
months after the outbreak of World
War II, he went to a cinema in the
Yorkville district of Manhattan. The
area was largely German-speaking
and the film he saw was a Nazi
account of their conquest of Poland.
When Poles appeared on the screen,
he was startled to hear people in the
audience shout, “Kill them! Kill
them!”
Auden was stunned. Amid all the
changes of heart and mind he had
passed through in his life, one thing
had remained consistent: He believed in the essential goodness of
humanity. Now suddenly, in a flash,
he realized two things with the force
of an epiphany. On the one hand, he
knew beyond any argument that
“human nature was not and never
could be good”—the reaction of the
audience was “a denial of every
humanistic value.” On the other
hand, he realized that if he was to say
such things were absolutely evil, he
had to have some absolute standard
by which he could judge them.

signals of transcendence” is positive
because it points toward the positive
conclusions of true aspirations, unnoticed before. In the comfort of his
room, Dr. Emerson Eames is mired
in his gloom, but when confronting
the starkness of death in the beauty
of dawn, an enjoyment of life begins
to shine in his eyes. This first contradicts his put-the-puppy-out-of-itsmisery pessimism. Then instinctively, intuitively, irrepressibly, and
undeniably, his gratitude to be alive
punctures his pessimism and points
beyond it to the possibility of higher
meaning in life. Gratitude quite literally became Eames’s pointer
toward salvation, just as it did for his
creator in real life.
Berger defines signals of transcendence as “phenomena that are to
be found within the domain of our
‘natural’ reality but that appear to
point beyond that reality.” His discussion of them in A Rumor of
Angels includes some signals that are
positive—for example, order, humor, and hope—and some that are
negative—for example, his “argument from damnation.”
The best-known example of a
positive “signal” in real life is C. S.
Lewis’s “surprised by joy”—experiences that prodded him toward
being a “lapsed atheist” and set him
off on a search for meaning. But
Berger’s argument from damnation
is particularly powerful and common, as in the poet W. H. Auden’s
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Here, Auden realized, was the fatal
flaw of his liberalism: “The whole
trend of liberal thought has been to
undermine faith in the absolute.” Or
as he remarked to a friend, “The English intellectuals who now cry to
Heaven against the evil incarnated in
Hitler have no Heaven to cry to.”
Spurred by this contradiction-cumyearning, Auden left the cinema on a
quest to renew his “faith in the
absolute” and began the journey that
led him to faith in Christ.
No human being lives outside the
reality common to us all. Whatever
people may say the world is or who
they are, it is what it is and they are
who they are. No argument is unarguable, but there are thoughts that
can be thought but not lived. When
all is said and done, reality always
has the last word. The truth will
always out. Standing up to falsehood, lies, and crazy ideas is never
an easy task, but it is far easier than
the hardest task of all, becoming
people of truth ourselves.
Reprinted, by permission, from Os Guinness,
Time for Truth: Living Free in a World of Lies,
Hype, and Spin (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker
Books, 2002).
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negative. This in itself leaves some
people uncomfortable, and an added
problem occurs when people use the
approach in a purely logical way. In
searching for any and all contradictions, they end up being tiresomely
fussy and unconvincing.
In contrast, the real task is to be
prophetic, not pedantic; to search
for contradictions that matter—and
matter not to us but to the people we
are engaging. In other words, the
goal is to look for the contradictions
between logic and life, to search for
the tension between the relativism
or skepticism of their philosophy
and the “treasure of their heart.”
Only the latter will become a smartbomb to detonate fresh thinking.
Because of the negative nature of
the first strategy, many people are
more drawn to the second tactic for
countering relativism on its own
grounds, which is entirely positive:
“Pointing out the signals of transcendence.” By this is meant the
strategy of drawing attention to the
contradiction and yearnings within
people’s beliefs that point beyond
those beliefs toward entirely different possibilities.
Whereas “relativizing the relativizers” is negative because it highlights the negative consequences of
false assumptions, “pointing out the

signals of transcendence” is positive
because it points toward the positive
conclusions of true aspirations, unnoticed before. In the comfort of his
room, Dr. Emerson Eames is mired
in his gloom, but when confronting
the starkness of death in the beauty
of dawn, an enjoyment of life begins
to shine in his eyes. This first contradicts his put-the-puppy-out-of-itsmisery pessimism. Then instinctively, intuitively, irrepressibly, and
undeniably, his gratitude to be alive
punctures his pessimism and points
beyond it to the possibility of higher
meaning in life. Gratitude quite literally became Eames’s pointer
toward salvation, just as it did for his
creator in real life.
Berger defines signals of transcendence as “phenomena that are to
be found within the domain of our
‘natural’ reality but that appear to
point beyond that reality.” His discussion of them in A Rumor of
Angels includes some signals that are
positive—for example, order, humor, and hope—and some that are
negative—for example, his “argument from damnation.”
The best-known example of a
positive “signal” in real life is C. S.
Lewis’s “surprised by joy”—experiences that prodded him toward
being a “lapsed atheist” and set him
off on a search for meaning. But
Berger’s argument from damnation
is particularly powerful and common, as in the poet W. H. Auden’s
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experience that stopped him in his
tracks and turned him around to
start his journey toward faith.
In 1939 Auden emigrated to the
United States. In November, two
months after the outbreak of World
War II, he went to a cinema in the
Yorkville district of Manhattan. The
area was largely German-speaking
and the film he saw was a Nazi
account of their conquest of Poland.
When Poles appeared on the screen,
he was startled to hear people in the
audience shout, “Kill them! Kill
them!”
Auden was stunned. Amid all the
changes of heart and mind he had
passed through in his life, one thing
had remained consistent: He believed in the essential goodness of
humanity. Now suddenly, in a flash,
he realized two things with the force
of an epiphany. On the one hand, he
knew beyond any argument that
“human nature was not and never
could be good”—the reaction of the
audience was “a denial of every
humanistic value.” On the other
hand, he realized that if he was to say
such things were absolutely evil, he
had to have some absolute standard
by which he could judge them.

Here, Auden realized, was the fatal
flaw of his liberalism: “The whole
trend of liberal thought has been to
undermine faith in the absolute.” Or
as he remarked to a friend, “The English intellectuals who now cry to
Heaven against the evil incarnated in
Hitler have no Heaven to cry to.”
Spurred by this contradiction-cumyearning, Auden left the cinema on a
quest to renew his “faith in the
absolute” and began the journey that
led him to faith in Christ.
No human being lives outside the
reality common to us all. Whatever
people may say the world is or who
they are, it is what it is and they are
who they are. No argument is unarguable, but there are thoughts that
can be thought but not lived. When
all is said and done, reality always
has the last word. The truth will
always out. Standing up to falsehood, lies, and crazy ideas is never
an easy task, but it is far easier than
the hardest task of all, becoming
people of truth ourselves.
Reprinted, by permission, from Os Guinness,
Time for Truth: Living Free in a World of Lies,
Hype, and Spin (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker
Books, 2002).
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